“No man is an island entire of itself” wrote the famed poet John Donne in 1624. His words were intended to entrench into the mind of his readers and listeners the concept that humans are fundamentally social creatures: that to strive for anything, one must take into consideration one’s fellow great apes. A populist, therefore, understands this concept well, as it is the primary vehicle by which a practitioner of the political approach gains power – the adaptation of the will of the many into a political entity, with collective, massive agency. Juan Peron’s outsized political marks on Argentina are connected inextricably to populism, with most accrediting him as a latent champion of the strategy. Understanding the Peronist period in Argentina requires understanding populism. Thus, I will argue that the approach Horowitz takes to defining populism is too timid to produce a satisfactory definition of populism, which, by the nature of the fact that it is a political strategy, must be understood abstractly and in principles, not localised mundanities. Following this critique, I will beckon to Horowitz call to give further thought to populism, and in so doing provide a definition of populism that is satisfactory via Occam’s Razor, and incorporates some of Horowitz work into this definition. Finally, I will show why the focus on populism during the rule of Juan Peron might not yield the fullest picture, while describing his populist actions using my definition. It will thus be established that populism in its nature is a broad and flexible political strategy, used effectively by Peron, as shown by his election to the presidency 1946.
Let us first understand what Horowitz thinks of populism. He takes some time to come to a definition in his paper “Industrialists and the Rise of Peron, 1943-1946: Some Implications for the Conceptualization of Populism”, yet when he does, he first proposes that to be a populist, one must court the support of workers and industrialists (1990, 211). Despite this early a priori supposition, Horowitz gives some challenges to definitions which fall along the same line. Specifically, Horowitz critiques Torcuato Di Tella’s definition that populism must be a political alliance of multiclass individuals by pointing out that industrialists had no major or manifested support for Peron (1990, 214), and indeed that any other examples of support from many classes are merely nominal, such as in the case of the lower-middle class, which was working class in actuality (1990, 215). Furthermore, Horowitz creates the foundation for me to rebuff the idea that populism has to be tied to a particular ideological movement, which is put forth by Ernesto Laclau. Laclau proposes that Peronist populism is based on an anti-liberal ideology (1990, 213). This is false insofar as the kind of pro-worker policies which Peron sought to push are aligned precisely with liberal policies. If taken as economic liberalism, it is false also, being that nationalisation was not so much the goal as was the amelioration of workers’ rights.
With the above attempts at apprehending populism seemingly impractical, let us turn to Horowitz musings on the matter. He supposes that populism has to do a great deal more with the style and rhetoric of its practitioner than practicable policy, though policy may play a role in the image. I heartily agree. Reality is what humans perceive it to be, and if the perception is that one is a great supporter of the masses, the masses will support in turn – the events behind the scenes are irrelevant. I would point to evidence of this being the case in a contemporary example: the 45th President of the United States of America, Donald John Trump. His policies, which sought to gut programs that inarguably improved the lives of the many – the Affordable Care Act – and weakened taxes on the rich, would provide the image of an industrial elitist. Nonetheless, Trump had most support amongst workers and poorer individuals without a college education. I would point to his rhetoric as the bridge between this discontinuity. Trump presented himself as an antielitist, painting the Democrats as an intellectual and cultural elite rather than an economic elite, and moreover, he supposed that economic differences are totally inconsequential, using his own wealth to put himself forward as an embodiment of the American Dream. From the above, I assert the following about the nature of populism. To be effective, it must sway the opinion of the many – hence why its etymology is derived from the Latin “populus”, meaning people. Whichever cross-section of class this mass is composed of is irrelevant to the greater definition, so long as the mass creates a powerful enough entity to be impactful. Moreover, the fact that the majority is seen as inferior to an elite encourages successful populist movements to also align themselves against a given elite. The most effective populist strategies create an illusory elite, whilst retaining the support of the real elite and the many, such as Hitler’s antagonisation, demonisation, and persecution of the supposedly elite Jews. I draw the following definition of populism from the above: populism is a political strategy which involves gathering mass support by whichever means appeals most to the given mass, often involving anti-elitist gestures, even if the appeal to the masses is done only through rhetoric, in an effort to create a political organ with sufficient agency to have impact.
Having established a definition of populism, let us observe Peron’ use of it in Argentina, as well as why some aspects of his political power might not have been in the sphere of populist influence. Peron, during his service as head of the Department of Labor, conducted the department in a manner which could not stop itself from creating an enemy out of the industrialist elites. As Horowitz explains, the elites had little and waning love for Peron during his time in the department, most obviously due to his fervent support for the working classes through policies of leaves, wages, safety, and control of the factory floor (1990, 209). In doing so, Peron clearly acted in a populist manner – creating the foundation for mass support amongst the working classes, who numbered far higher than all the industrialists and owners put together. Peron, however, could not or did not manage the height of excellency in populism – to retain the support of the elites and the masses. This is due to two things. Firstly, the scrutiny which the unions and other vehicles of mass agency had in analysing who to support – exemplary amongst whom was the clearly sceptical Angel Borlenghi, whose support of Peron was based on actual policies combined with prospects of power, wavering when Peron seemed in a position to be swept aside. Thus, buying mass support with rhetoric and trinkets was less plausible. Second, there was no practical false elite against whom Peron could act to drum up support – the industrialist class was the opposition of the masses in terms of interests, and were therefore the only clear class Peron could challenge in gaining mass, populist support. This lack of illusions was not necessarily a negative for Peron, being that his inscrutable support of the working classes bought him an election victory in 1946, despite mass hatred by industrial elites. Yet, populism does not go to a great enough extent to explain the victory. Elite support is often crucial for political success, considering the money and influence which it offers. Nonetheless, Peron had the support of the great anti-elitist powers – the police and the military. Being therefore able to resolutely crush elite opposition if it sprang up in an extra-legal manner ensured that the support of the masses which Peron had was respected and that no military minority could crack down on a militarily inferior majority. Hence we see why populism requires agency – to be effective the people who it draws in must have sufficient agency to make change, and if respect for elections and transparent institutions are not a part of the political ecosystem in which populism is functioning, having the advantage of arms is pivotal to said agency.
In sum, I find that populism is a flexible political strategy which involves the acquisition of mass support in order to create powerful political organs with agency to create change, used effectively by Juan Peron in his bid to secure power in Argentina through the employment of popular, worker-oriented labour policies. Thus, populism left its mark on Argentina, as it has left a mark on many countries in the world, indicating indisputably that the people do have power, and harnessing it is an effective method for personal advancement.
Works Cited
Horowitz, Joel. Industrialists and the Rise of Peron, 1943-1946: Some Implications for the Conceptualization of Populism in “The Americas.” Cambridge University Press, pp. 209, 211, 213, 214, 215. 1990, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1007372
Really insightful!